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MR. HARRINGTON: Has Verizon been disciplined or penalized for other parties' violating CPNI requirements?

MS. LANGSTINE: For other parties?

MR. HARRINGTON: Yes.

MS. LANGSTINE: Not to my knowledge.

MR. HARRINGTON: I would like to talk for a moment about the process Verizon would use to address the abuse of CPNI.

> MS. LANGSTINE: Okay.

MR. HARRINGTON: And I would like you to turn to Cox Exhibit Number 31.

Now, this exhibit indicates that Verizon 14 won't make any determinations about CPNI violations 15 but would file complaints about Cox's behavior if 16 necessary. I would like to explore what that 17 means.

I guess I will start with this: Can I 19 assume that Verizon will not go to, say, the 20∥Virginia Commission or the FCC about every use of CPNI that Cox might make?

MS. LANGSTINE: First of all, I think we

1 need to clarify something, that Verizon is not 2 monitoring for content, okay? We are looking for 3 outlying behavior. This specifically more applies 4 to the GUI than to ap-to-ap EDI application. If we are looking to a specific end user who is doing 5 | 6 uncontrolled searches or searches outside what a normal person would do on a Web GUI, okay? question we ask ourselves is what this person accessing and could they possibly have permission to access all of these things?

So, I want to put that in context, okay? We do not monitor for content.

MR. HARRINGTON: Let's turn then to Verizon's proposed language. And for this purpose 15 I would like to--you could look at the Joint 16 Decision Point List. Do you have that in front of 17 you?

> Would you say that again. MS. LANGSTINE:

MR. HARRINGTON: Joint Decision Point

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MS. LANGSTINE: I don't think I have it.

MR. HARRINGTON: I will read to you from

1 what on my copy is page five, which is Verizon's 2 proposed contract language to Cox.

> MS. LANGSTINE: Page five?

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MR. HARRINGTON: It may be a different page on yours, but it shouldn't be too far off.

MR. OATES: Section 18.4.4?

MR. HARRINGTON: Yes.

MS. LANGSTINE: I have that, yes.

MR. HARRINGTON: Okay. Could you read for 10∥me--yes, I guess the first sentence of that.

MS. LANGSTINE: Okay. BA shall have the 12 | right to monitor and/or audit Cox's access to and 13 use and/or disclosure of customer proprietary 14 network information that is made available by BA to 15 | Cox pursuant to this agreement, to ascertain 16 whether Cox is complying with the requirements of 17 | applicable law in this requirement with regard to 18 such access, use, and/or disclosure.

To the extent permitted by applicable law--

21 MR. HARRINGTON: I only needed the one 2 2 II sentence.

MS. LANGSTINE: I'm sorry.

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MR. HARRINGTON: Now, does that provision limit Verizon's monitoring to the volume of usage by Cox?

MS. LANGSTINE: That's our understanding That's how we determine there could be potential abuse.

MR. HARRINGTON: As I have read your testimony, it appears that what you're saying is at 10∥this time Verizon only monitors extensive use as opposed to what it's used for; is that correct? I read your testimony, what it says merely is that 13 | Verizon's practice is not to monitor anything but the volume of use. Is that a fair statement?

MS. LANGSTINE: That is correct, we monitor the volumes.

MR. HARRINGTON: But can you find anything 18 in this language that prevents from you monitoring the actual CPNI obtained by Cox as a for-instance, the content as you said earlier?

MS. LANGSTINE: I can't say there is 22 anything specifically in that language, 18.4.4.

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MR. HARRINGTON: Okay. Let's turn back to what we were discussing earlier, which are the standards.

I think it is fair to say that Verizon doesn't expect to go to the Virginia Commission or the FCC for every use of CPNI that Verizon intends to apply some sort of screen to decide, and as you described it, wasn't that screen the volume?

MS. LANGSTINE: Yes. It would be our intention to make it known to a CLEC that there is a potential there, and we would ask them to look into it.

MR. HARRINGTON: I see. Okay. Let's actually talk about the scenario you have in your testimony, and I'm referring now to what is Verizon Exhibit 6 of your testimony at page three, line 17 to 18. And there you describe a scenario in which Verizon believes there was abused, and you described that as larger than normal preorder 20 activity.

Now, you would go to Cox and say please 22 explain this to us; is that correct?

1 MS. LANGSTINE: That needs a little clarification. Preorder activity in general, as long as a single-user ID was not issuing thousands, 3 if Cox--if every user of Cox, you know, there was increase of preorder activity, that's fine. That's 6 your prerogative to use the interface. What we are talking about is individual users on the Web GUI. 8 | If we saw just general increase in preorder transactions, there would be no understanding of 10 misuse or abuse of the OSS. It would be, again, 11 Web GUI, single-user ID with thousands of 12 transactions.

MR. HARRINGTON: But there's nothing in 14 the contract that says that's all you're going to 15 look for; right?

MS. LANGSTINE: I can't say there are 17 specific words to that, no.

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MR. HARRINGTON: But let's go back to the 19|hypothetical. Cox, you see what you think is 20∥unwarranted increase by whatever criteria Verizon 21 has adopted. You go to Cox and say "please explain 22 this. Cox gives you--says, We looked at it, and

1 we think it's legitimate." Is it over, then? MS. LANGSTINE: I would say that's a 2 3|single occurrence, Verizon would say, "Great, thank We appreciate you looking into this, " and $5 \parallel \text{yes}$, we would assume that. If there was continued 6 evidence or continued -- I'm trying to think of the 7 | right word. Continued evidence that we see this happening over and over again, then I guess there 9 would be a different conversation that we would 10 have with the CLEC. 11 MR. HARRINGTON: Is there some point at which you would then go to the state regulator or the FCC? 13 l 14 MS. LANGSTINE: I suppose there would be 15 at some point. But again, I think that would be an 16 extraordinary measure. 17 MR. HARRINGTON: Now let's assume for the 18 moment there is a benign explanation--19 MS. LANGSTINE: You're fading on me. 20 MR. HARRINGTON: Let's assume for a moment

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incident.

that there is a benign explanation for a particular

Do you think that the very act of Verizon going to talk to Cox might affect Cox's behavior in the future?

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MS. LANGSTINE: Would it affect -- in what I would assume that if there was a benign wav? answer and that every party was satisfied, that there would be -- that that would be the end of it, and I wouldn't expect Cox to have to alter their 9 behavior if there was nothing to alter.

MR. HARRINGTON: But you just said a moment ago, if the same thing happened again, despite the benign explanation, that you would come back to Cox again, and if you saw it happening repeatedly, you would then go to a regulator. So, aren't you expecting that your consultation with the CLEC is going to affect the CLEC's behavior?

MS. LANGSTINE: I would expect that if the CLEC found that one of their employees or one of their--someone working on their behalf was doing something improper, that they would take care of it. Whether or not they advised Verizon of that is one thing, but if--but they would take care of it.

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follow that.

again.

If they truly found something that was amiss or that was something that should not--was 3 not following the proper procedures, that they would handle it. And if that was a change in 5∥behavior, then yes, I would expect them to make a change of behavior if they found something that 7 needed to be changed.

MR. HARRINGTON: Let's go back to the hypothetical we were talking about. Cox says there 10 | is a benign explanation for this, and you say okay, there was a benign explanation, we are fine.

In that scenario as opposed to the one you discovered where Cox discovered there was someone acting badly and fixes it, where there is a benign explanation, wouldn't you expect that the same thing would happen again if it was perfectly reasonable that Cox was doing something lawful? MS. LANGSTINE: I'm honestly not sure I

MR. HARRINGTON: Okay. I will go back

The scenario is this: Cox has an

1 unexpected increase, a larger than normal preorder 2 activity, to quote your testimony--

MS. LANGSTINE: Would that be with one individual or Cox in general?

MR. HARRINGTON: Let's assume for the moment one individual. 6 |

> MS. LANGSTINE: Okay.

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MR. HARRINGTON: Let's assume Cox has a small number of individuals who do this activity.

One individual, Verizon goes to Cox, Cox says we checked it out, there wasn't anything wrong going on there. Verizon, according to you, says, 13 that's fine, and the situation recurs, and Cox 14 tells you again there was no--there was nothing 15 wrong going on there. Am I correct to assume that 16 at some point you're going to stop believing Cox?

MS. LANGSTINE: I would say at some point there would be a lot more serious discussion as to 19 what was going on, and there would be some--there 20 would have to be some determination that either 21 someone acting on behalf of Cox was doing the wrong 22 thing, and would have to be corrected, because the

issue here is you are impacting other CLECs. You are impacting Verizon's responsibility to provide that open access to its OSS.

MR. HARRINGTON: But that's not actually a CPNI issue, then?

MS. LANGSTINE: I can't hear you.

MR. HARRINGTON: That's not the CPNI

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MS. LANGSTINE: Not specifically related to the CPNI issue, but as I said in my testimony we monitor for two reasons. One is for the open access. The second is to make sure that activity of the CLECs is in accordance with the prescribed use of that OSS. And one of those obligations is to protect CPNI.

MR. HARRINGTON: But let's focus on the CPNI, though. You're indicating in your testimony that you have dual purposes for monitoring the CPNI use, and one of the significant ones is the OSS, and we have talked about the OSS already and, I think, addressed your reasons for that. But why is increase in volume an indicator of violation of

CPNI requirements?

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MS. LANGSTINE: Increase in volume in general is not. One person--or I should correct that to say one user ID initiating thousands of transactions, why else you would be doing that? guess it calls into question your use of CPNI, and it's something we would need to have a discussion about.

MR. HARRINGTON: Well, then, it seems to me you're suggesting there are no possible benign explanations for large increases in user activity by a single user ID; is that right?

MS. LANGSTINE: I'm saying that, number one, one user ID, large numbers of transactions, is 15 clearly against the policy of using the Web GUI, 16 and it is clearly written and documented in our procedures, and continued use of that is something that would cause Verizon and the offending CLEC to need to really have very serious discussions about. What you're doing, why you're doing it, and how we could remedy that.

> Leaving aside the Web GUI MR. HARRINGTON:

question, is it your view that a sudden increase in access to CPNI--and I understand your software concerns--I'm not talking about those--a sudden increase in access to CPNI demonstrates a violation of the requirements governing CPNI under Federal

6 law? Or is there some other explanation that would

7 be all right with you?

MS. LANGSTINE: If there was increased uses, increased access to that, no, there would be no general reason why increased access is considered an abuse.

MR. HARRINGTON: But that's the example you give in your testimony, isn't it?

MS. LANGSTINE: It was a--it was an example of something that could happen.

MR. HARRINGTON: Now, let's talk a little bit about what might cause large increases.

MS. LANGSTINE: Say that again.

MR. HARRINGTON: Large increases to access

20 to CPNI.

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MS. LANGSTINE: Okay.

22 MR. HARRINGTON: Could they be a result of

a brand new successful marketing campaign?

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2 MS. LANGSTINE: I suppose that's possible, 3 yes.

MR. HARRINGTON: Could they result from just beginning to offer service in a new area where service was not previously offered?

MS. LANGSTINE: Yes, there are a number of very valid reasons, two of which you just mentioned as to why you might see increased pre-order and order activity from any one CLEC, in general, from their access methods.

MR. HARRINGTON: I would like to go back now to questions about safeguards on the use of 14 information Verizon obtains from monitoring.

Is there anything in the agreement that prevents Verizon from using information gained from CPNI monitoring for win-back activities?

I don't think there is MS. LANGSTINE: anything specific to the -- in the contract relative to that.

MR. HARRINGTON: Is there anything in the 22 agreement that would prevent Verizon from targeting 1 marketing to areas where Cox has been successful in getting new customers?

MS. LANGSTINE: I'm not sure why we would be prevented from having a marketing campaign of lour own.

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MR. HARRINGTON: Let me ask the question differently. Is there anything in the agreement that would prevent Verizon from using its knowledge of Cox's access of CPNI to target its marketing 10 campaigns?

MS. LANGSTINE: I'm not sure, but Verizon 12 does not use the information for monitoring its OSS 13 for marketing reasons.

MR. HARRINGTON: But there is nothing in the agreement that you know of that would prevent 16 | it?

MS. LANGSTINE: There is nothing in the agreement that says you cannot use information, but as I said, Verizon--there is--I mean, Verizon is aware of customers that it has lost to other CLECs, 21∥just4 as CLECs, just like you are aware of 22 customers you have lost to other CLECs.

MR. HARRINGTON: I would like you to turn
to your rebuttal testimony, which is Verizon

Exhibit 20, and we will look at page three, lines
through 18.

MS. LANGSTINE: Did you say 13 through 18?

MR. HARRINGTON: I pointed you to the

wrong page.

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MS. LANGSTINE: Okay.

MR. HARRINGTON: It's page two, lines five--I was looking at the wrong reference page.

Page two is the sentence that begins on line five and continues through line eight.

MS. LANGSTINE: Page two, begins "While Verizon VA has no reason to doubt"?

MR. HARRINGTON: Correct.

And that sentence indicates that there is nothing Verizon could do to, and I'm paraphrasing here, prevent a rogue individual from acting improperly.

Isn't that true of Verizon as well?

MS. LANGSTINE: Yes, Verizon has corporate policies in place to try to prevent this as well.

MR. HARRINGTON: Right, but there is 1 2 | nothing Verizon could do to prevent an individual 3 from breaking those corporate policies? MS. LANGSTINE: I'm not saying there is 4 nothing Verizon could do. I'm aware of a number of employees who have been terminated from Verizon for accessing information that they should not have. Verizon is very careful to provide access 8 to the--to specific systems, unless there is a 10∥business need. We have a requirement for passwords. We do not provide information even to 12 other employees because there is a very clear 13 guideline that states, if you don't need to have this information, do you not have access to it. 15 MR. HARRINGTON: That's sufficient for 16 | Verizon? 17 That is not sufficient for MS. LANGSTINE: Verizon if we find it is violated. 19 MR. HARRINGTON: But you believe you have got sufficient protections in place internally? 21 MS. LANGSTINE: Yes, I do. 22 Do you have any reason to MR. HARRINGTON:

1 doubt that any of the CLECs in this proceeding, and

2 Cox in particular, don't have sufficient

protections in place?

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MS. LANGSTINE: I'm honestly not aware of Cox's policies and procedures, so I can't make that comment. I'm only aware of Verizon's.

MR. HARRINGTON: But you don't have any reason to think there is anything wrong with Cox's Your point here is more speculative than 9 policies. 10 anything else, isn't it?

MS. LANGSTINE: I have no reason to 12 believe that they would not try to have the best 13 policies and procedures in place.

MR. HARRINGTON: I have no further 15 | questions.

> Thank you. Who is next? MR. DYGERT:

MR. LOUX: One suggestion, since AT&T is 18 only interested in--let me rephrase that. Since there is one issue we are currently involved on 19 | 20 this panel, I wonder if it makes sense for me to go first and you examine on your three? Just one. Ιs 22 that okay with you?

1 MR. DYGERT: That's fine. 2 CROSS-EXAMINATION 3 MR. LOUX: Can you hear me? My name is Ridge Loux, and I'm an attorney with AT&T. I have a couple of questions for you with respect to issue I-11. MS. LANGSTINE: Yes. 8 MR. LOUX: First, could you tell me, 9 please, besides your testimony this morning, is there any other testimony of record in this proceeding by you addressing this issue? 12 MS. LANGSTINE: No, there is not. 13 MR. LOUX: Okay, so I take that to mean--let me ask it differently: Are you aware of any testimony or other evidence in this proceeding 15 addressing issue I-11? 16 l 17 MS. LANGSTINE: I am--I am knowledgeable of some testimony. 19 MR. LOUX: By Verizon on this issue? 20 MS. LANGSTINE: I believe that there was some testimony--let me get this right. Actually, 21 22 I'm not sure I am.

1 MR. OATES: The issue is I-11, not I-10.

2 MS. LANGSTINE: I'm there, I-11. I know

Verizon has stated their position with this. not aware of any specific testimony.

5 MR. LOUX: Okay. Then let's move to a few points I would like to follow up on that

Mr. Harrington explored with you.

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The first one I would like to ask, if you know how many distinct systems, Verizon systems, comprise the OSS to which CLECs would have access.

MS. LANGSTINE: No, there are a large 12 | number of systems.

MR. LOUX: If I were to represent to you when we asked this question of Verizon in this proceeding, we asked to name each distinct system for which costs are included in Verizon's access to OSS, that 20 were identified, would you have any reason to disagree with that number?

MS. LANGSTINE: Did you say 22?

20, two zero. MR. LOUX:

MS. LANGSTINE: Oh, 20. Since I haven't seen that response, I really can't comment on that.

1 MR. LOUX: Okay. Let me ask this: Do I understand the way the provision to work to mean that if Verizon determined that the breach by a CLEC of access to any one of those systems be at 20 or any other number, would entitle Verizon to terminate or suspend access to all of them? that right? 8 MS. LANGSTINE: It's my understanding that we include a number of systems in the OSS, the interfaces as well as the back-end systems, yes. 10 11 MR. LOUX: Just so I understand, so that a breach as determined by Verizon of access to any one of them could entitle Verizon under this clause 13 to terminate or suspend access to all of them; 14 15 correct? 16

MS. LANGSTINE:

MR. LOUX: Thanks.

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One of those systems, I believe, and correct me if I'm wrong, is a system known as "live 20 wire"; isn't that right?

MS. LANGSTINE: Live wire, yes.

MR. LOUX: It's a pre-order system in

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1 which a CLEC or Verizon can determine things like address validation and number reservation and features in a switch, things of that nature? True?

MS. LANGSTINE: Yes, that's true.

I interrupted. I didn't mean MR. LOUX: Did you finish your answer?

MS. LANGSTINE: Yes, I did. I just said we use live wire for mostly pre-order.

MR. LOUX: Okay. Now I would like to follow up a bit on the hypothetical Mr. Harrington was exploring with you.

If a CLEC were to access live wire when it first entered a market, is it likely--let me rephrase it differently.

When a CLEC first enters the market, wouldn't the amount of activity of a CLEC accessing 17 live wire be relatively low?

MS. LANGSTINE: Again, I'm not a marketing expert, but I would assume that as you enter a market, your volume is low and it grows.

MR. LOUX: Okay. Assume for me, if you would, that AT&T has entered into a market in

Virginia, and has for a while maintained a 2 relatively low profile, and therefore its use of and access to live wire has remained relatively low and stable; okay?

> MS. LANGSTINE: Okay.

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MR. LOUX: Over--not over time, but at a point in time AT&T's access of live wire spikes dramatically and Verizon notices that. Would Verizon maintain that that's a breach of AT&T's access to live wire?

MS. LANGSTINE: No. I believe I already explained that in that volumes in and of themselves are not indicative of any abuse, okay? Or misuse or breach of any contract, okay? There is an expectation that volumes grow over time, depending upon the maturity of the marketplace.

Again, what I said here is that a very--we are talking about an individual user would 191 have--again, it would have to be a very large number of transactions, something that would be impossible for a human being, sitting in a terminal, using ISP access. These are the kinds of 22

things that we would look at.

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So, just a general, you know, upward--upward volume, that's not going to be indicative of any abuse.

MR. LOUX: So, do I understand you to say if AT&T's access of live wire for a period of time is low and stable, and then dramatically increases to a point that might otherwise cause you suspicion, but simply increases dramatically and 10∥maintains at that higher level that in and of 11 itself is not an indication to you of potential 12 breach?

> MS. LANGSTINE: Not necessarily, no.

MR. LOUX: Well, what if someone in 15 Verizon would think otherwise?

MS. LANGSTINE: Well, you know, I don't 17∥think that these things are done arbitrarily. think that there has to be a -- there has to be harm shown to the system. Volumes in and of themselves do not harm our systems. It would have to be such a serious -- we are talking about -- I'm assuming this 22∥is all in relation to I-11, which is talking about

1 termination of the OSS. There would have to be a 2 serious interference with our OSS that either no 3 other CLEC could use it, or our back-end systems would have to be seriously impaired, such as the $5 \parallel loss$ of database records. Volumes are only indicative of use in this particular instance that you point out.

MR. LOUX: Okay. Who in Verizon would 9 make the determination of serious impairment?

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MS. LANGSTINE: I'm sure that we would probably have our IT professionals, would be the people who would be looking into the damage that if this, again, hypothetical situation occurred, that it would be our IT professionals who would be 15 | looking into this.

If the IP professional were to MR. LOUX: 17∥say whoever makes the determination, AT&T's use of 18∥live wire is no longer legitimate pre-order activity, but is simply trolling or marketing 20 function, would such a determination constitute a 21 breach to entitle Verizon to suspend access under 22 this clause?

MS. LANGSTINE: I don't think that a single instance of that -- I don't believe that we would terminate the OSS access on a single breach of something--of any of our agreements. I think it would have to be -- again, it would have to be so extraordinary that you would be damaging the access to the other CLECs or you would be seriously causing harm to databases or access to our back-end systems.

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MR. LOUX: Thank you, Mrs. Langstine. Ι 11 have no further questions.

MR. OATES: Could I interject something there before Mr. Loux moves on, and perhaps he is aware, but Verizon did file rebuttal testimony with regard to issue I-11 on August 17. Ms. Langstine's 16 name is not on that panel. At such a time during the process of this when we realized the convergence of issues I-8 and I-11, we offered her 19∥up as the appropriate witness, we offered her up as If he wants to 20 the appropriate witness. cross-examine on that testimony, I don't want the record to reflect he didn't have an opportunity or